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Political turnover disrupts connections between political and economic actors, produces changes in economic policy, and creates uncertainty, with potential consequences for economic performance. Beginning with the seminal work of Londregan and Poole (1990) , Barro (1991) , and , the possible impact of turnover on economic performance has been incorporated into cross-country empirical work on growth and investment through the inclusion of measures of political instability. More recently, scholars working on the economic consequences of political connections have examined the differential impact of political turnover on politically connected firms (e.g., Fisman, 2001; Fisman et al., 2012; Ferguson and Voth, 2008) .
Of course, not all turnover is bad for economic performance. Bates and Block (2013) , for example, demonstrate that total factor productivity growth is greater in African countries with competitive executive elections-that is, in countries in which peaceful transfers of power are likely. But the potential for political turnover to negatively affect economic performance for some actors, even as it improves it for others, is especially large in countries with weak institutions (North, Wallis and Weingast, 2009, p. 263) . In such countries, political turnover can redistribute connections in a way that makes doing business harder for some firms and easier for others; weak property rights can leave firms vulnerable to expropriation when political patrons disappear. Moreover, a relative absence of checks and balances implies that changes in power can produce large swings in economic policy, while a lack of transparency increases opportunities for discrimination and favoritism.
We examine the impact of political turnover on economic performance in a setting of largely unanticipated turnover and profoundly weak institutions: the 2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine. Our research design exploits a sharp divide in Ukraine's political-economic geography. The old regime was tied to business owners and managers in the eastern part of the country, whereas Viktor Yushchenko, who successfully contested power in 2004 at the ballot box and in the street, had his political base in the west. The Orange Revolution dramatically shifted the geographic balance of power from the first region to the second. We 1 thus identify the impact of political turnover on economic performance through a differencein-differences design that compares the relative performance of pro-and anti-Yushchenko regions before and after 2004.
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Our empirical focus is firm productivity, which we estimate with census-type panel data on over 7,000 Ukrainian manufacturing enterprises. The idea that turnover can affect productivity is not new (see, e.g., Alesina and Perotti, 1996) , but most existing work focuses on investment or profits, which have a more tangential relationship to economic welfare. An important exception is the work of Haber and Razo (1998; see also Haber, Razo and Maurer, 2003) , who document the impact of the Mexican Revolution on productivity in a single sector (the cloth textile industry). To our knowledge, there is no analogous work that identifies the differential impact on productivity in sectors or regions differently affected by political turnover. The few papers that examine the relationship between political connections and productivity do so in a cross-sectional setting (e.g., Guriev and Rachinsky, 2005; Faccio, 2010; Desai and Olofsgard, 2011) , so that the impact of changes to connections cannot be identified.
We find a sharp divergence after the Orange Revolution in the relative performance of firms between regions supportive of and opposed to Viktor Yushchenko. Our results suggest that the productivity of firms in the most pro-Yushchenko regions increased by more than 15 percentage points in the three years following the Orange Revolution, relative to that in the most anti-Yushchenko regions. Guided by a discussion of the various channels through which political turnover might affect productivity, we conclude that this effect is driven primarily by particularistic rather than general economic policies that disproportionately increased output among large enterprises, government suppliers, and private enterprises-three types of firms that had much to gain or lose from turnover at the national level.
Our results demonstrate that political turnover in a context of weak institutions can 1 In related work, Malesky and Samphantharak (2008) exploit differences in gubernatorial turnover to test theories about the predictability of corruption.
2 have substantial distributional effects that are reflected in economic productivity. The next section describes the channels through which such effects might operate.
Political turnover and firm behavior
Political turnover can lead to changes in firm behavior through various channels. A new government may change official policies towards business, including taxes and regulations that affect the incentives of firms to invest, eliminate redundant labor and capital, refrain from asset stripping, seek out new markets, create new product lines, and otherwise take costly actions with the potential to improve firm performance. Political turnover may also be accompanied by changes in more subtle practices involving enforcement, corruption and predation, which may be less easily observed but matter just as much if not more for the business environment (e.g., Fisman and Svensson, 2007) . Political turnover may also raise uncertainty to the extent that either the objectives of the new leaders, or their ability to implement their goals, are unknown; indeed, some economists have recently argued that uncertainty of the latter sort creates a substantial drag on U.S. economic growth (e.g., Baker, Bloom and Davis, 2013) These channels are economy-wide in their impacts, and not necessarily discriminatory across different groups or regions. For instance, any change that reduces the overall security of property rights will have a general tendency to reduce investment, growth, and productivity throughout the economy.
Other channels are more likely to lead to differential effects. Particular firms or those in particular regions or sectors may gain political connections while others lose them. Especially when institutions are weak, such connections can provide various economic benefits, including direct subsidies, preferential access to inputs (including credit from state-controlled banks), and government contracts. The reallocation of contracts following political turnover may be particularly attractive because it is less transparent than open subsidies or changes to legislation and regulations.
Policies that superficially seem to be general may also have differential effects. For 3 example, trade liberalization will hurt import-competing sectors while it benefits users of imported raw materials and intermediates, as well as consumers more generally. To the extent that firms in such sectors are are distributed non-uniformly across space, this may result in regional differences in the response to turnover. Political turnover that leads to efforts to redress past discrimination and favoritism will also have differential effects on the winners and losers from these changes.
To the extent that differential effects are driven by particularistic policies, or the removal of such, these may be more evident among some types of firms than others. Large firms, for example, may be more likely than small firms to rely on ties to national politicians for support and protection, implying that channels working through political connections would be reflected in size-related differences. (Large firms may also benefit disproportionately from general improvements in the business climate because of financial resources or diversification.
Further below we discuss the empirical implications of these alternative perspectives.) Similarly, business groups with direct representation in government (e.g., owners or managers who sit in parliament) may be more sensitive to changes in national political coalitions.
Heterogeneous effects may also be reflected in other firm characteristics. Firms in sectors that are government suppliers may be more reliant on political connections, especially when an absence of transparency and rule of law allows for favoritism in awarding contracts. In an environment of economic transition, the incentives of private firms may also be more sensitive to political turnover. Policies to reverse privatizations conducted by previous governments can encourage firms to delay restructuring, especially if the original allocation of property rights was questionable legally or ethically.
2 Alternatively, privately owned firms may be more active in restructuring and investment; such firms will be more reliant on a "helping hand" for complementary infrastructure and more exposed to the "grabbing hand"
of obstructive or predatory government behavior (Frye and Shleifer, 1997; Brown, Earle and 2 Frye (2006) shows that "good works" can reduce the threat of renationalization for such firms.
Gehlbach, 2009).
Finally, the various channels through which political turnover affects firm performance may be reflected in the components of productivity, which in general is defined as the ratio of output to inputs. Threats to property rights should discourage investment, though effects on other variables are also possible: most any productivity-enhancing change is an "investment"-a costly action with an uncertain return-and thus subject to the same considerations as investments in physical capital. Improvements in the business climate, which can be conceptualized as the elimination of transaction costs, should work in the opposite direction. Last, any impact that operates through increased business opportunities, such as the reallocation of government contracts, should be reflected at the output margin. Whether inputs are similarly affected depends on the extent to which firms are already operating at capacity.
We return to these channels and provide empirical evidence on their relative importance further below, after describing our data, empirical strategy, and baseline estimates of the impact of political turnover on productivity. First, however, we discuss the political context for our analysis of these issues.
Political context
In late December 2004, following a tumultuous month of street protests and a do-over election, Viktor Yushchenko was declared the president-elect of Ukraine. The events of that period are commonly known as the Orange Revolution. Kuchma. Although Yushchenko was initially given little chance of winning the presidency, the "mood gradually changed during the long election campaign" (Kuzio, 2006, p. 46) . The growing fear during 2004 of a Yushchenko victory would lead to his poisoning in September at the probable hands of Yanukovich's political operatives, and subsequently to massive electoral fraud to secure Yanukovich's victory in a runoff election on November 21. The popular unrest that followed, modeled to some extent on earlier "color revolutions" in the postcommunist region (Beissinger, 2007; Tucker, 2007; Finkel and Brudny, 2013) , ultimately led to the do-over election that catapulted Yushchenko to the presidency.
3
Ukraine under Kuchma was a paradigmatic case of "patronal presidentialism," in which the president "wields not only the powers formally invested in the office but also the ability to selectively direct vast sources of material wealth and power outside of formal institutional channels" (Hale, 2005, p. 138) . During the latter years of his reign, Kuchma utilized these powers in return for the support of a narrow business elite drawn primarily from the ethnically Russian east of the country. 4 As in other postcommunist countries (Gehlbach, Sonin and Zhuravskaya, 2010) , the influence of these business groups was cemented through representation in official government positions: using data that we describe further below, Gorodnichenko and Grygorenko (2008) report that in 2002 over one-quarter of large firms in eastern Ukraine belonged to a business group with a representative in parliament or government, far in excess of the ratio elsewhere.
The regional divide was exacerbated by Kuchma's choice of successor, as Yanukovich was closely associated with mining and steel interests in the southeastern region of Donetsk. His
Regions of Ukraine was the most prominent example of the parties of power that served as "political kryshy [roofs] for corrupt, oligarchic and regional interests, not for clearly defined ideologies" (Kuzio, 2005, p. 356) . Fearful of loss of access under Yushchenko (in the words 7 that are not either strongly pro-Yushchenko or strongly pro-Yanukovich. Yushchenko's political base was in the most western, historically Hapsburg part of the country (Clem and Craumer, 2005) , and he owed nothing to the men who had financed the campaign against him. Upon taking power, Yushchenko named Yulia Tymoshenko, an oligarch-turned-populist who was one of Ukraine's savviest political operators, to head a short-lived government that was notable for the absence of easterners. Just as important, Yushchenko replaced every one of Ukraine's regional leaders, exercising the power of the president to appoint governors.
These representatives of presidential authority play a key role in directing federal resources and allocating land and permits to local businesses; they consequently have enormous (and lucrative) influence over the fortunes of enterprises in their regions.
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In addition to these personnel changes, Ukraine's new leaders took various actions that threatened the eastern economic order. A series of investigations were launched against eastern businessmen, including the Donetsk industrialist Rinat Akhmetov, Ukraine's richest man, who temporarily fled the country in response to an inquiry into his connections with organized crime (Katchanovski, 2008) . In addition, a noisy campaign in favor of "reprivatization" (i.e., nationalization and subsequent privatization of previously privatized enterprises) targeted many of the eastern businessmen who had acquired assets under Kuchma on the cheap (Paskhaver and Verkhovodova, 2007) . The threat was credible, given the overwhelming majority of Ukrainians who were in favor of revising privatization (Åslund, 2009, pp. 206-207 ; see also Denisova et al., 2009 ). In the end, only two previously privatized enterprises were seized by authorities, but the perceived threat to property rights has been blamed for the collapse in GDP growth that followed the Orange Revolution (Åslund, 2005 As discussed in the previous section, events such as these can have various effects on firm performance, some of which may be distributional in nature. Given the strongly regional character of the Orange Revolution, in the context of presidential authority exercised at the regional level through gubernatorial appointments, our emphasis is on differential changes in the productivity of firms located in Yushchenko and Yanukovich regions, respectively. In the following section, we describe the data used to estimate such changes.
Data
Our research design employs a multilevel approach, with firms nested in 27 regions (oblasti )
of Ukraine. Our firm-level data are collected by the Ukrainian State Statistics Service (Derzhkomstat) and its Soviet-era predecessor. The primary source is industrial-enterprise registries, which include all industrial firms with more than 100 employees, plus those that are more than 25 percent owned by the state and/or by legal entities that are themselves included in the registry. Once firms enter the registries, they typically continue to report even if the original conditions for inclusion are no longer satisfied. The data thus correspond to the "old" sector of firms (and their successors) inherited from the Soviet system. We supplement the registry data with balance-sheet data and information from the State Property Committee and State Securities Commission, all linked over time using a firm identifier (OKPO) to construct a panel.
The resulting database includes measures of Output, Employment, Capital stock, and ownership, as well as industry affiliation and regional location. With respect to ownership, we classify firms as Domestic private if the state holds less than 50 percent of the shares and domestic private shareholders own more than foreigners; the firm is classified as Foreign private if the state holds less than 50 percent of the shares and foreign shareholders own 9 Interview with Andriy Servetnuk, Deloitte and Touche, June 2010. Notes: Means and standard deviations. Capital and output are expressed in constant 2002 prices: millions of hryvnias. Output equals the value of gross output net of VAT and excise taxes. Employment equals the average number of registered industrial production personnel, which includes non-production workers but excludes "nonindustrial" employees who mainly provide employee benefits. Capital equals the average book value of fixed assets used in the main activity of the enterprise, adjusted for revaluations. The domestic and foreign private dummies are based on Derzhkomstat ownership classifications as of December 31st of the previous year.
more than domestic private owners. The residual category is state ownership. To maximize comparability and data quality, we exclude non-manufacturing sectors and non-profit organizations from the sample, and we include only firms that are state-owned on entry into the database. Finally, we retain firm-years in the sample only when they contain complete information, which does not reduce the sample appreciably. For one exercise, we supplement these firm-level data with data on Oligarch ownership from Gorodnichenko and Grygorenko (2008) . As described in that paper, a firm is considered to be "owned by an oligarch" if it belongs to a business group of at least three firms, at least one of which is a for-profit enterprise, where the parent entity coordinates the decisions of firms in the group and has a public representative in either the government or parliament. Unfortunately, the data are only available as a cross section, for 2002. Moreover, we are able to match the data in Gorodnichenko and Grygorenko with only 1,662 of the 7,684 enterprises in our dataset. Many of the unmatched firms are disproportionately small and/or never privatized and thus unlikely to be oligarch assets. We therefore set oligarch ownership equal to one if the firm is coded as such in Gorodnichenko and Grygorenko's dataset, and zero otherwise, which results in a coding of oligarch ownership for 243 firms, or slightly over three percent of our sample. This likely represents a lower bound on the actual level of oligarch ownership of firms in our dataset.
We use region-level data on the Yushchenko vote in the do-over runoff election of December 2004. As indicated in Table 2 
Empirical strategy
We are interested in comparing changes in firm performance after the Orange Revolution in regions that were more or less supportive of Viktor Yushchenko, the ultimate victor in the 2004 presidential election. Our performance measure is multifactor productivity. 10 Our baseline estimating equation is
where j indexes firms, r indexes regions, s indexes industries, and t indexes years. The variable x jrst is output, k jrst is capital stock, and l jrst is employment. We assume an unrestricted
Cobb-Douglass production function f s , which we allow to vary by manufacturing industry at the two-digit level, with 22 distinct sectors in our data.
Our difference-in-differences estimates are captured in the coefficient on the interaction term O t V r , where the dummy variable O t is an indicator for the Post-Orange Revolution period, set equal to 0 through 2004 and 1 thereafter, whereas the variable V r is the Yushchenko vote in the do-over 2004 presidential election, as described in the previous section.
The "direct effect" O t is absorbed by the industry-year fixed effects ψ st : adopting vector notation,
where I t is the N × 22 matrix of industry dummies for year t (with N the number of observations), and 1 is the 22 × 1 vector (1, . . . , 1). Similarly, the variable V r is absorbed by the firm fixed effects, as firm location is constant over time. The variable γ in Equation 1 10 Multifactor productivity is sometimes referred to as "total factor productivity," implying that all factors of production are included, but in practice some factors are unobserved. Our method takes into account firm-specific, time-varying levels of capital and employment; firmspecific constants (fixed effects) and trends; and a full set of industry-year interactions to control for differences in other factors.
12 is our coefficient of interest: the differential effect of the Orange Revolution on multifactor productivity in regions more or less supportive of Yushchenko.
These estimates control for a great deal of heterogeneity over time and across firms, regions, and sectors. The vector Z jrt includes various time-varying firm and regional characteristics; in some specifications, these include firm-level indicators for domestic private and foreign ownership at the end of year t − 1. To avoid contaminating the estimates with industry-specific shocks or mismeasured relative prices, we include a full set of industry-year fixed effects, ψ st , so that comparisons are within industry-year cells. Finally, we correct for firm-specific heterogeneity through the term w t α j , where w t is a vector of aggregate time variables and α j a vector of firm-specific coefficients.
We consider two specifications of w t . The first defines w t = 1, so that α j is a firm fixed effect; the second defines w t = (1, t), with α j a firm-specific linear trend. We emphasize the second specification (a "random-growth" model) because it has a number of advantages.
First, firm location is constant over time, so the inclusion of firm-specific trends implicitly captures region-specific trends.
11 This helps to ensure that the difference-in-differences assumption of parallel trends across regions in the absence of treatment (conditional on covariates) is not violated. Similarly, the random growth model controls for different trend growth rates in productivity at the firm level. Second, as Brown, Earle and Telegdy (2006) show using similar data, the inclusion of firm-specific trends corrects for selection into type of ownership-state, domestic private, or foreign private-which will be an important issue when we focus on the differential effect of the Orange Revolution on private and state-owned enterprises.
12
11 Similarly, the inclusion of firm fixed effects implicitly captures region fixed effects. There are a very small number of cases in our data of firms changing location. For these firms, we define region as the modal region across years.
12 The existence of long panels, as in our dataset, is especially important when including unit fixed effects and trends. Observe that any trends in firm performance are net of industry-
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Finally, the variable η jrst is an idiosyncratic error. We report heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors that correct for clustering of errors at the region level, which, given that firms are nested in regions, also correct for arbitrary correlation of errors within time series for individual firms.
5 Difference-in-differences results
The first two columns of Table 3 present our baseline difference-in-differences estimates for models with firm fixed effects and firm-specific trends, respectively. Although the estimated effect of the Orange Revolution is positive in both cases, it is larger and more precisely estimated in the second. Recalling that Yushchenko's vote share in the December 2004 election ranged from 0.04 to 0.96 (the density is mostly in the tails), the result in Column 2 implies a relative change in multifactor productivity after the Orange Revolution of approximately 17
percentage points in the most pro-Yushchenko region, compared to the most pro-Yanukovich region. Alternatively, a one-standard-deviation increase in Yushchenko vote (0.308) is associated with a relative increase in productivity of 6 percentage points. To put this in perspective, using data similar to those in this paper, Brown, Earle and Telegdy (2006) estimate that domestic privatization increases multifactor productivity (measured from the year before privatization to three years after) by 12 percent in Ukraine, versus 38, 20, and -8 percent in Romania, Hungary, and Russia, respectively. (We consider variation over time in the private-ownership effect further below, where we take advantage of an additional five specific shocks, such as those associated with the economic transition and the output collapse in the 1990s, given the inclusion of industry-year fixed effects. Finally, we explore the dynamics of the estimated treatment effect. To do so, we estimate the following variant of Equation 1:
where R t (Pre-treatment) is equal to 0 for all years strictly before 1998 and equal to t − 1997 for all subsequent years, M t (Treatment) is equal to 0 for all years strictly before 2005 and equal to 1 for all years thereafter, and P t (Post-treatment) is equal to 0 for all years strictly regions is correlated with industrial structure. As before, the estimated effect is substantively large and statistically significant, with a point estimate only slightly lower than that in Column 3. The results reported in this section prove to be quite robust.
Interpretation and mechanisms
In this section, we interpret and unpack the result documented in Section 5: an increase in multifactor productivity following the Orange Revolution in regions supportive of the winning candidate, relative to regions that supported the old regime. Subject to data limitations, our aim is to shed light on the theoretical channels that might account for this result. Following the discussion in Section 1, we explore three types of evidence: evidence of general versus particularistic policies; estimation of heterogeneous effects across types of firms that might be more or less vulnerable to political turnover; and exercises that separately examine the impact of the Orange Revolution on output, labor, and capital.
General versus particularistic policies
In principle, the differing performance of Yushchenko and Yanukovich regions following the Orange Revolution could be a consequence not of particularistic policies, but of general policy changes that affected productivity in similar ways across regions, with differences in regional economic structure leading to different outcomes. Our empirical strategy rules out the most obvious such "composition effects": with a full set of of industry-year controls, any effects of the Orange Revolution that operate at the sector level should be held constant.
Nonetheless, there could be other aspects of regional economic structure that create varying responses to identical policies.
Ideally, we would explore this possibility using data on other firm characteristics, the distributions of which are potentially heterogeneous at the regional level. Unfortunately, other than ownership, which we take up further below, our dataset does not include the variables necessary for this sort of analysis. We therefore turn to aggregate economic data, running regressions on regional panel data using the variables from the Ukrainian State Statistics Service summarized in Table 2 . The general idea is to estimate the impact of the Orange Revolution on various macroeconomic outcomes in regions that are relatively more or less pro-Yushchenko. Given that our firm-level data are all manufacturing enterprises, we expect to find an effect on industrial production similar to that identified in the previous section.
14 Beyond that, we look for effects on macroeconomic outcomes that might reflect general changes in economic policy refracted through regional differences in economic structure.
14 To the extent that they are not, this could raise concerns about systematic bias in our firm-level data, as might occur if firms were differentially inclined to truthfully provide data to statistical authorities (Zhuravskaya, 2007) . Notes: All dependent variables in logs but industrial production and unemployment, which are an index and rate, respectively. The regressions in Columns (4)-(7) control for (log) population. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: *** = 0.01, ** = 0.05, * = 0.10. Revolution by small-business associations (Duvanova, 2013, pp. 79-80) . All in all, we find no evidence of broader macroeconomic effects of the Orange Revolution that might explain the regional pattern identified with our firm-level data.
A related question is the following: Does the regional divergence represent a new policy of discrimination against Yanukovich regions, or is it rather the consequence of a leveling of the playing field, with firms in Yushchenko regions benefiting from support previously reserved for those in areas supportive of the old regime? The empirical strategy presented in Section 4 provides no leverage in answering this question, as the presence of fixed effects (and trends) precludes estimation of absolute changes in productivity following the Orange Revolution.
To make further progress, it is necessary to compromise on identification, sacrificing fixed effects and trends in order to gain some evidence for interpretation. We estimate The causes of the latter development seem not to be general changes in economic policy, but rather changes to how firms in various regions were treated by the state. To further explore this idea, we now proceed to examine heterogeneity in the response at the firm level. 15 We are grateful to Oksana Kuziakiv of IERPC for providing these data. 
Heterogeneous effects
As discussed in Section 1, theories about how particularistic policies affect productivity may have observable implications if certain types of firms are more sensitive to political turnover.
Our data allow us to distinguish among firms along four such dimensions. First, large firms may be more affected by who is in power at the national level than are small firms, which may be more likely to rely upon local politicians for political support and protection. Second, firms that are owned by politically connected business groups-"oligarchs"-may have more to gain or lose from a redistribution of political connections. Third, firms in sectors that are major government suppliers may be more vulnerable to disruptions of political connections.
Finally, when institutions are weak, the productivity of private firms may be more responsive to turnover than the productivity of state-owned enterprises, either because the security of their private property rights depends on maintaining connections to the governing elite, or 23 because they stand to gain more from an improved business environment.
Examining these hypotheses presents a number of identification and measurement issues.
With respect to size, whether a firm is large or small is to some extent endogenous to decisions that affect productivity. Further, as discussed in Section 3, oligarch ownership is measured with considerable noise and is only available as a cross section (for 2002). More generally, ownership is not randomly assigned but the consequence of decisions made by government officials about which firms to target for privatization and by entrepreneurs about which firms to acquire. Finally, we observe sector but do not have direct data on government contracts.
We deal crudely with these problems for the effects of firm size, oligarch ownership, and government supplier. For size, we create the dichotomous variable Large, set equal to one if the firm's mean employment prior to 2004 is greater than 150, the conventional cutoff in the literature for small and medium-sized enterprises. The resulting variable is less sensitive to labor restructuring than the underlying employment measure. With respect to oligarch ownership, we create a dummy variable for firms that are oligarch-owned in 2002. Finally, we proxy for government supplier by creating the indicator Equipment supplier, set equal to one for firms with NACE code 29 (manufacture of machinery and equipment, which includes weapons and ammunition) or 35 (manufacture of other transport equipment, which includes rolling stock and aircraft but excludes automobiles). Although there may be many nongovernment suppliers in these sectors, the relative importance of government contracts is likely greater than for the full sample. Table 5 provides results for size, oligarch ownership, and government supplier. The results in Column 1 indicate that the impact of the Orange Revolution is heterogeneous across size classes and regions. Relative to small firms, large firms see substantial productivity reductions in pro-Yanukovich regions following the Orange Revolution, whereas there is no significant effect of firm size in pro-Yushchenko regions. Put differently, where a firm is located is a predictor of productivity changes following the Orange Revolution only for large enterprises-a finding consistent with the hypothesis that large firms are more sensitive to Notes: The dependent variable is log(Output), and the independent variables include log(Capital) and log(Employment), with coefficients permitted to vary across industries at the two-digit level. In parentheses, heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors adjusted to allow for clustering at the regional level. Significance levels: *** = 0.01, ** = 0.05, * = 0.10. political turnover at the national level because of the nature of their political connections.
In contrast, if large firms benefited disproportionately (e.g., because of financial resources or diversification) from an improvement in the business climate that was constant across regions, we would expect to see a size effect that did not vary by Yushchenko vote.
Column 2 presents analogous results for models with our oligarch measure. The sign and magnitude of the coefficient suggest greater vulnerability of oligarch-owned firms to political turnover, but the estimated effect is statistically insignificant at conventional levels.
The large standard errors are consistent with substantial heterogeneity in the behavior of oligarch-owned firms: perhaps some firms owned by oligarchs, who as defined here have formal representation in the government or parliament, find it comparatively easy to forge 25 new connections following political turnover. When we include interactions with both size and oligarch ownership in a single equation, the qualitative results are essentially unchanged from those reported in Table 5 : size clearly matters, whereas the effect of oligarch ownership is unclear.
Finally, Column 3 presents results for models with our proxy for government supplier.
The regional effects identified in the previous section are substantially larger for firms in the equipment-supply sector. A natural question is whether this productivity effect is driven by changes at the output margin, as would be the case if government contracts were reallocated after the Orange Revolution to firms in regions supportive of Yushchenko. We take up this question in our "decomposition" exercises further below.
We now proceed to consider the differential response of private firms to the Orange Revolution. Given that private ownership is reliably measured for all firm-years in the sample, we have a clearer path to identification. We follow the two-step approach in Brown,
Earle and Gehlbach (2009), which first uses firm-level panel data to estimate the effect of private ownership on multifactor productivity at the regional level, following which those estimates are regressed on various regional characteristics; details are in the online appendix. 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Yushchenko regions Yanukovich regions In sum, the regional shift in productivity gains following the Orange Revolution seems to have been greater for large firms, firms that are government suppliers, and private enterprises.
By assumption, these actors are more sensitive to particularistic policies (though private firms may also be more sensitive to general improvements in the business climate), thus reinforcing the general interpretation of our results above.
Decomposition
As discussed in Section 1, some channels through which political turnover affects productivity may work through output, others through employment or investment in capital, and some through all of these variables. Reallocation of government contracts, for example, should appear in output, and perhaps also (to the extent that firms are already operating at close to full capacity) in inputs. Fear of renationalization, in turn, should reduce investment and In parentheses, heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors adjusted to allow for clustering at the regional level. Significance levels: *** = 0.01, ** = 0.05, * = 0.10.
restructuring, while improved government performance (more "helping," less "grabbing") should increase them.
To explore this idea, we estimate the differential impact of the Orange Revolution on the three components of productivity, as measured here: output, labor, and capital. (We refer to this exercise as "decomposition" of productivity into its components, though strictly speaking there is no decomposition of multifactor productivity, unlike labor productivity.) Table 6 presents our baseline results. Firms in Yushchenko regions experience a sizable but imprecisely estimated increase in output following the Orange Revolution, and a smaller but statistically significant decrease in capital. Productivity, of course, responds positively to marginal increases in output and decreases in inputs, but only the output result is consistent with our theoretical priors.
Although intriguing, these results mask considerable heterogeneity in the firm-level response to political turnover. The online appendix presents models in which the treatment effect is allowed to vary by type of firm, as in the estimation of heterogeneous effects above.
The main finding is that the relative increase in output in Yushchenko regions following the Orange Revolution is stronger (larger in magnitude, statistically significant) for large enterprises, for firms in the equipment-supply sector, and for private enterprises. The marginal effect is strongest (0.329, SE = 0.170) for firms in the second group; the negative estimated treatment effect in the capital regression in Table 6 also switches signs for such firms. This relative increase in both outputs and inputs is strong evidence for the reallocation of government contracts as a key channel through which political turnover affects productivity.
Nonetheless, the similar (though smaller) results for large and private enterprises indicates that other factors may also play a role.
Conclusion
Following the 2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine, firms in regions supportive of the new president exhibited a substantial increase in multifactor productivity, relative to firms in regions supportive of the old regime. Although the policies and channels through which this result emerged are difficult to measure and can be discerned only indirectly, our examination of possible evidence suggests that this effect was driven by particularistic rather than general economic policies, with firms in Yushchenko regions benefiting from support previously reserved for those in Yanukovich regions. This geographic pattern is most pronounced among large firms, firms in sectors that supply the government, and private enterprises, all of which had much to gain or lose from national political turnover in a context of generally weak institutions. "Decomposition" of the productivity effect into its components for various firm types indicates that reallocation of government contracts may drive much of our result, though there is room for other mechanisms.
Political turnover is often desirable. Nonetheless, the distributional consequences can be profound when institutions are weak. Oscillation of privilege from one region or sector to another is inefficient, as firms initiate or postpone restructuring based on who happens to be in power. The first-best solution is not to restrict turnover, but to make turnover safe for economic activity, which requires reforming institutions to credibly commit to equal treatment for all actors. Our results suggest that some leveling of the playing field may have indeed occurred in the years that immediately followed the Orange Revolution. Un-fortunately, our data extend only through 2007, prior to Viktor Yanukovich's victory in the presidential election of 2010. Anecdotal evidence suggests that Yanukovich's years in power were marked by a new turn to favoritism, which if true would imply that the institutional basis for any leveling was limited. Allegations of corruption, of course, were a major factor in the Euromaidan protests of 2013-14, which ultimately led to Yanukovich's ouster and the election of chocolate magnate Petro Poroshenko. Whether firm performance continued to respond to political turnover during these later periods is an important topic for future research.
Appendix 1: Instrumental-variables regression
Although our research design takes into account many correlated factors through the inclusion of firm and region fixed effects and firm-specific trends, a possible concern is that the 2004 election results could be endogenous to firm performance at the regional level. Voters may have responded positively or negatively to firm restructuring, for example, depending on how any such restructuring was carried out, and firm owners may have helped to generate votes in return for certain privileges. Notes: The dependent variable is log(Output), and the independent variables include log(Capital) and log(Employment), with coefficients permitted to vary across industries at the two-digit level.
Column (4) is an instrumental-variables regression, with the estimated coefficient on the excluded instrument reported. In parentheses, heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors adjusted to allow for clustering at the regional level. Significance levels: *** = 0.01, ** = 0.05, * = 0.10. The estimated treatment effect reported in Table A1 is large and statistically significant.
The point estimate of 0.165 is only marginally smaller than that in the corresponding regression in Column 3 of Table 3 . Our qualitative findings are thus robust to exploiting regional ethnicity as a plausibly exogenous source of variation in the 2004 election results.
Appendix 2: State versus private ownership
We follow the two-step approach in Brown, Earle and Gehlbach (2009) , which first uses firm-level panel data to estimate the effect of private ownership on multifactor productivity at the regional level, following which those estimates are regressed on various regional characteristics. Our method differs from Brown, Earle, and Gehlbach primarily in the nature of higher-level variation that we exploit: rather than focusing on cross-sectional variation, we take advantage of a shock that affects regions differentially. Thus, we estimate time-varying regional effects of private ownership on firm performance in the first step of our two-step procedure.
Formally, we estimate the following variant of Equation 1:
where D jrst is an indicator for domestic private ownership. The region-year ownership effects (δ rt ) control for variation in industrial composition across regions and over time through the sector-year ownership effect ϑ st . The variable F jt is an indicator of whether the firm was foreign-owned at the end of year t − 1; given the very small number of foreign-privatized firms in our data set, we do not attempt to estimate a separate foreign-ownership effect for each region-year, but rather assume an effect (φ) that is constant across region-years. For
conciseness, in what follows we often refer simply to estimated private-ownership effects,
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omitting the qualifier "domestic."
As discussed in Section 4, Brown, Earle and Telegdy (2006) show that estimation with firm fixed effects and firm-specific trends (i.e., w t = (1, t)) corrects for selection into domestic private or foreign ownership. Our estimates of regional ownership effects are therefore based on deviations resulting from privatization from the productivity trend for each individual firm, controlling for industry-year shocks. Thus, for example, private ownership would have the same impact on two firms-one in a sector experiencing rapid technological improvement, the other burdened with excess employment-if it increased productivity two percent above a positive trend in the first case and two percent above a negative trend in the second.
Equation A1 allows these regional effects to vary over time-in particular, around the Orange Revolution, which occurred some years after most firms were privatized.
The estimating equation for the second step of our two-step procedure is then
whereδ rt is the estimated region-year private-ownership effect from estimation of Equation Notes: Dependent variable is estimated regional effect of private ownership on firm productivity from firm-level FE&FT regression. Heteroskedasticityrobust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: *** = 0.01, ** = 0.05, * = 0.10.
OLS and FGLS estimates.) Table A2 presents results from the second step of this two-step procedure. For most specifications, we report results for a balanced panel of estimated private-ownership effects from 1996 through 2007, as there are relatively few privatizations prior to 1996, and we drop
Sevastopol from the analysis, as there are very few firm-year observations in that region (city). Column 5 extends the panel to include these estimated region-year effects. The results show a robustly larger impact of the Orange Revolution on privately owned firms, consistent with the idea that the defeat of Yanukovich may have particularly threatened the property rights of private owners connected to the old regime or that the incentives of private owners are more sensitive to general changes in the business climate.
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Appendix 3: Decomposition
The following tables present additional results from our decomposition exercise. Table A3 : Decomposition-size, oligarch ownership, and government supplier Notes: All dependent variables in logs. In parentheses, heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors adjusted to allow for clustering at the regional level. Significance levels: *** = 0.01, ** = 0.05, * = 0.10. Notes: Dependent variable is estimated regional effect of private ownership on firm productivity from firm-level FE&FT regression. Heteroskedasticityrobust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: *** = 0.01, ** = 0.05, * = 0.10.
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